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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

This article examines participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs among young adult
(nineteen to twenty-five years of age), low-income families in 2004. Section II provides
a brief overview of both programs and reviews related literature about program use.
Section III poses the main study questions, describes the study methods, presents
findings, and discusses the implications for social welfare policies. The study finds that
program use varies by age, number of children in the household, ethnicity/race, work
effort, marital status, prior program participation, and sex of participants. Those with two
or more children, the least education, ethnic/racial minorities, women, and married
persons are more likely than their respective counterparts to take advantage of either or
both vis-à-vis neither program. Findings suggest that EITC and TANF are well-targeted,
but underutilized programs.
II. PROGRAM OVERVIEWS
A. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)

¶2

The EITC is a major means-tested program1 and the only one that is a refundable
tax credit.2 If the amount of the credit exceeds the taxpayer’s federal income tax liability,
the excess is payable to the taxpayer as a direct transfer payment.3 Enacted in 1975
during the Ford administration as part of Title I of the Tax Reduction Act4 to offset the
∗
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1
Richard K. Caputo, The Earned Income Tax Credit: A Study of Eligible Participants and Nonparticipants, 33 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 9, 10–13 (2006). Other major means-tested programs include
Food Stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), TANF, programs subsidizing child care, and
Section 8 housing programs.
2
Stacy Dickert-Conlin, Katie Fitzpatrick & Andrew Hanson, Utilization of Tax Income Credits by LowIncome Individuals, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 743, 743 (2005).
3
STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 108th CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS 13-39 (Comm. Print 2004).
4
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 32, 89 Stat. 5 (1975). At the time, this was the largest
tax cut in U.S. history. See RICHARD K. CAPUTO, WELFARE AND FREEDOM AMERICAN STYLE II: THE ROLE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1941–1980, 517 (1994). For a brief legislative history, see STAFF OF THE
H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 3, at 13-35; for a political history, see Dennis J. Ventry, The
Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969–99, 53
NAT’L TAX J. 983 (2000).
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burden of the Social Security tax on low-income working parents,5 the EITC, made
permanent during the Carter administration,6 generally equals a specified percentage of
wages up to a maximum dollar amount. The maximum amount applies over a certain
range of income and diminishes to zero over a certain income range. The EITC thereby
has three ranges: phase-in, maximum credit, and phase-out, each of which varies by the
number of qualifying children in the family. In the phase-in range, the EITC acts as a
wage subsidy—as the family earns more, the transfer increases. In the maximum credit
range, the transfer remains constant regardless of earnings. In the phase-out range, the
EITC acts like a negative income tax—as the family earns more, the transfer is reduced.7
While the phase-in range provides a work incentive, the maximum and phase-out ranges
have work disincentives for some families.8
The income ranges and percentages have increased several times since 1975,
expanding the credit, as have the number of participants. It should be noted that the
congressional mindset favoring the EITC in the 1970s coalesced in the context of debates
about unsuccessful welfare reform initiatives that had embodied pro-work, pro-growth,
and low-cost policies.9 The EITC program matured as an anti-poverty strategy in 1986
when Congress raised the maximum benefit, which had fallen by thirty-five percent in
real terms, to the 1975 level, increased the phase-out level to near the 1975 level, and
most importantly guaranteed the future integrity of the EITC by indexing it for
inflation.10 Nonetheless, a study of EITC participation and compliance concluded that
households having a legal requirement to file income taxes were more likely to file for
the EITC than those without such a filing status (such as families receiving public
assistance), with EITC take-up rates somewhere in the range of thirty-one to thirty-nine
percent in tax year 1988.11 In 1991, adjustments were made for low-income workers with
one or two or more children,12 and in 1994, low-income workers with no children were
eligible,13 increasing the take-up rate to an estimated fifty percent in 1999.14 Increases in
the number of EITC claimants reflected these changes. In tax year 1975, the first year of
the EITC, there were 6.2 million returns claiming the credit, staying constant until 1985,
when 6.5 million claimed the credit, doubling to 12.5 million returns in 1990, and nearly
tripling to 19.3 million in 1995.15 By 2005, the most recent year of available data at the
5

Ventry, supra note 4, at 993, 995.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 103, 92 Stat. 2771 (1978); see also Ventry, supra note 4, at
996.
7
STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 3, at 13-36.
8
A non-wage earning spouse in one-earner households would be discouraged from obtaining employment
if the combined income in the phase-out level was less than that of the one-earner income plus the EITC
benefit. For graphic illustrations of steeply declining EITC benefits as wages rise, see Dickert-Conlin,
Fitzpatrick & Hanson, supra note 2, at 747–48.
9
Defeated welfare reform initiatives included several Negative Income Tax schemes, such as the Family
Assistance Plan of the Nixon administration, and the Program for Better Jobs and Income of the Carter
administration. Ventry, supra note 4, at 984–97.
10
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2107 (1986); U.S. JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 27–28 (Comm. Print
1987), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/jcs-10-87.pdf; Ventry, supra note 4, at 1002–04.
11
Marsha Blumenthal, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Participation and Compliance with the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 189, 211 (2005).
12
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11111, 104 Stat. 1388–408 (1990).
13
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 433 (1993).
14
Blumenthal, Erard & Ho, supra note 11, at 211.
15
Timothy Dowd, Distinguishing Between Short-Term and Long-Term Recipients of the Earned Income
6
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time of this study, nearly 22.8 million returns were filed claiming the credit, nearly
seventeen percent of all tax returns filed for that tax year.16
In 2008, the minimum income for the maximum credit was $5720 for individuals
with no children, $8580 for those with one child, and $12,060 for those with two or more
children; the phase-out income range began at $7160 for individuals with no children and
$15,740 for those with children, and ended at $12,880 for individuals, $33,995 for those
with one child, and $38,646 for those with two or more children.17 It should be noted that
unlike public assistance programs in some states, single-parent and two-parent families
with similar income levels receive the same EITC benefit, and two-parent families with
similar income levels receive the same EITC benefit regardless of whether one or both
parents work.18 The three benefit formulas (for no children, one child, and two or more
children) have remained in place since 1994 and the subsidy rates have stabilized
respectively at 7.65%, 34%, and 40% since 1997.19
Prior to 2002, low-income taxpayers with a “married filing separate” status were
ineligible for the credit. This policy created a bonus for two very low-wage workers with
children because their joint return entitled them to a higher credit than would have been
the case had they filed separately, given the eligibility and phase-out levels of the credit
at the time of this study.20 However, a two-earner couple with children and $35,000 of
combined income was ineligible for the EITC if married, but eligible for a sizable credit
if they did not marry, live together, and raise a family.21 Although these two latter
couples had similar income and family responsibilities, they were not treated the same
under the tax code, violating the principle of horizontal equity.22 Many of the compliance
problems that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) faced, and that were addressed in midto-late 1990s legislation,23 were a function of the same issue, namely the relative
treatment of single and married taxpayers. Achieving marriage neutrality,
progressiveness, and equal taxation of couples with the same income was (and remains) a
Tax Credits, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 807, 810 (2005).
16
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1. INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS: SELECTED INCOME AND TAX ITEMS FOR
TAX YEARS 1999–2005, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histab1.xls.
17
TAX POLICY CTR., EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS, 1975–2008, 1 (Nov. 6, 2007), available
at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/historical_eitc_parameters.pdf.
18
ROBERT GREENSPAN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW RESEARCH
FINDINGS ON THE EFFECTS OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 1 (1998),
http://www.cbpp.org/311eitc.htm.
19
See TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 17.
20
Janet Holtzblatt & Robert Rebelein, Measuring the Effect of the EITC on Marriage Penalties and
Bonuses, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1107, 1108 (2000); see also David Ellwood, The Impact of the Earned Income
Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements, 53 NAT’L TAX J.
1063 (2000) (showing how subsequent changes in the EITC benefits served as a corrective).
21
Holtzblatt & Rebelein, supra note 20, at 1108, 1117–19.
22
See Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal Equity, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 195, 195
(Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 1999), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000533.pdf (defining horizontal equity as the principle
used to judge fairness in taxes in that taxpayers who have the same income should pay the same amount in
taxes); see also Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139
(1989) (arguing that recent attempts to implement horizontal equity are inconsistent with stated
foundations).
23
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §
909, 110 Stat. 2105, 2351–52 (1996); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5702, 111 Stat.
251, 648 (1997); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1085, 111 Stat. 788, 1920 (1997).
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longstanding tax problem.24 Finally, it should also be kept in mind that twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia have implemented their own EITC programs, adding
between five and twenty-five percent more credit above what is reflected in the present
assessment of the Federal initiative.25
B. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
¶6

Enacted into law on August 22, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) replaced the sixty-one year old
program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the block grant program
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), beginning July 1, 1997.26 The
AFDC program had survived two other reform efforts: the Nixon administration’s Family
Assistance Plan, which would have nationalized it and expanded cash benefits to lowincome workers,27 and the Family Support Act of 1988, which strengthened the link
between welfare receipt and work while retaining the federal entitlement nature of the
program.28 PRWORA authorized states to formulate their own programs, but imposed
work-trigger time limits, lifetime benefit limits, and minimum rates for work
participation.29 Enactment resulted in state-to-state variations in income thresholds for
cash assistance eligibility30 and the shortening of time limits below the federal five-year
maximum for use of federal funds.31 PRWORA was silent concerning states’ authority to
decide whether to count EITC payments received by TANF recipients as income. The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, however, prohibited EITC payments to TANF recipients
24

See, e.g., U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY (1998), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-

1-98.htm; Gordon L. Berlin, Rewarding the Work of Individuals: A Counterintuitive Approach to Reducing
Poverty and Strengthening Families, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2007, at 17, 23, available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/7_02_Berlin.pdf; Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and
the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975) (examining the theories and pressures shaping the Internal
Revenue Code and how its provisions may fare in light of changing social attitudes toward marriage, twojob couples, women’s rights, and the like); Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, Tax Reductions, Tax
Changes, and the Marriage Penalty, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 455 (2001) (showing how difficult it is to reduce the
marriage penalty in general in light of unintended effects, and how the Bush tax plan did not eliminate the
marriage tax while making it worse under some circumstances).
25
JASON LEVITIS & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE EARNED INCOME
TAX CREDITS: 2008 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 1 (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/6-6-08sfp.pdf.
26
STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 3, at 7-2.
27
Richard K. Caputo, Welfare, in THE SEVENTIES IN AMERICA 973, 973 (John C. Super & Tracy IronsGeorges eds., 2006); CAPUTO, supra note 4, at 443–507; Ventry, supra note 4, at 988–92.
28
Richard K. Caputo, October 13, 1988, U.S. Welfare Reform Links Assistance to Work, in GREAT EVENTS
FROM HISTORY: THE 20TH CENTURY, 1971–2000, 2215, 2215–16 (Robert F. Gorman ed., 2008); Richard K.
Caputo, Welfare, in THE EIGHTIES IN AMERICA 1038, 1038 (Berman Milton & T. Irons-Georges eds.,
2008).
29
STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 3, at 7-2.
30
See The Urban Institute, TANF Income Eligibility Thresholds,
http://www.urban.org/Uploadedpdf/900772_FastFact.pdf. In July 2002, for example, the initial earned
income thresholds for a family of three ranged from $205 in Alabama to $1,641 in Hawaii, with a national
average of $768. Eligibility was set between $200 to $399 in 5 states, $400 and $599 in 13 states, $600 and
$799 in 14 states, $800 and $999 in 5 states, and $1,000 and above in 14 states. Id.
31
See The Urban Institute, State Time Limit Policies,
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900769_FastFact.pdf. TANF established a maximum sixty-month
lifetime time limit on receipt of cash assistance, although no such limits were placed on “child-only” cases.
States were also permitted to exempt up to twenty percent of their caseload from the federal time limit. Id.
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whose earnings were derived from workfare.32 The TANF program was renewed through
September 30, 2010, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.33
The number of families TANF served declined from a high of 3.2 million in 1998,
its first full year of operation, to 2.1 million in 2005.34 Overwhelming majorities of
TANF families were single-headed in 1998 and in 2005, about 99.9% in each year.35 In
1998, there were 8.8 million recipients of TANF, 6.3 million (71.4%) of whom were
children; in 2005, there were 5.1 million TANF recipients, 3.8 million (74.6%) of whom
were children.36 Take-up rates of the AFDC program hovered between seventy-eight to
eighty-five percent throughout most of the 1980s and early 1990s, but began a precipitous
decline after 1994, dropping to fifty-six percent of eligible families for TANF in 1998
and to forty-two percent in 2004.37 As welfare participation decreased, as could be
expected, work effort was also found to increase. One Michigan-based study of
randomly selected single mothers obtained from the Women’s Employment Survey
showed an increase in the percent of the sample of those who worked twenty hours or
more in during the week of being surveyed but received no welfare to 37.3% in 1998
from 19.9% in 1997.38 The study also found declines in the percent of those who worked
and received welfare to 24.2% in 1998 from 36.9% in 1997, and of those who did not
work but received welfare to 23.8% in 1998 from 35.0% in 1997.39
There was some evidence that participation in welfare programs increased the
claim rate for EITC,40 although the evidence from most studies suggested an inverse
correlation between the two programs—that is, as participation rates in TANF declined,
those in EITC increased. In one study, counties with a hundred percent enrollment rate in
their respective California’s Welfare-to-Work programs vis-à-vis counties where nobody
enrolled in such programs were found to have increased the EITC claim rate by 2.3
percentage points.41 However, in one of the first studies to provide direct estimates of the
EITC on welfare use, Jeffrey Grogger reported that the EITC contributed to decreased
use of welfare among female-headed households between 1978 and 1999.42 This was
especially the case for families with the oldest among the youngest children: “[A] $1000
increase in the maximum credit would reduce welfare use by an average of 1.5
percentage points among families whose youngest child was three and by 3.1 percentage

32

Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1085, 111 Stat. 788, 956–57 (1997).
Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7101, 120 Stat. 4, 135 (2006).
34
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2007) A-9, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators07/report.pdf.
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
Id. at II-18. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE:
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, INDICATOR 4: RATES OF PARTICIPATION IN MEANS-TESTED ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS (2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators01/ch2.htm#i4.
38
Sandra Danziger, Mary Corcoran, Sheldon Danziger & Colleen M. Heflin, Work, Income, and Material
Hardship after Welfare Reform, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 6, 17 (2000).
39
Id.
40
V. Joseph Hotz, Charles H. Mullin & John Karl Scholz, Examining the Effect of the Earned Income Tax
Credit on the Labor Market Participation of Families on Welfare 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11968, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11968.
41
Id.
42
Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Time Limits, The EITC, and Other Policy Changes on Welfare Use, Work,
and Income among Female-Headed Families, 85 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 394, 394–96 (2003).
33
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points among families whose youngest child was ten.”43 A study that relied on female
TANF recipients in Wisconsin in 1997 provided indirect support for Grogger, reporting
that TANF participation rates in 1999 and 2000 were twenty-nine percent, whereas EITC
participation rates were seventy-five percent.44
III. STUDY
¶9

The present study relied on panel data to examine the relationship between EITC
and TANF participation among self-reported EITC-eligible low-income families. It
addressed the following questions:
(1) What proportion of EITC-eligible low-income families participated in
neither EITC nor TANF?
(2) What proportion of EITC-eligible low-income families participated
only in EITC?
(3) What proportion of EITC-eligible low-income families participated in
both EITC and TANF?
(4) What proportion of EITC-eligible low-income families participated
only in TANF?
(5) How did program participation among EITC-eligible low-income
families vary by sociodemographic characteristics such as education,
ethnicity/race, marital status, and sex?
Answers to these questions were meant to identify gaps in program use such that outreach
efforts might be better targeted to increase take-up rates.
A. Method
1. Data

¶10

Data came from Round 9 of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
(NLSY97), the newest survey in the NLS program and the most recent round of data
available at the time of this study.45 NLSY97 was designed to be representative of people
living in the United States in 1997 who were born between 1980 and 1984.46 Many of
the oldest youth (age sixteen as of December 31, 1996) were still in school at the time of
the first survey and the youngest respondents (age twelve) had not yet entered the labor
market. The NLSY97 cohort included 8984 individuals. Responsibility for
administration of the NLS resides with the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, which contracts with both the Center for Human Resource Research at The
Ohio State University and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
University of Chicago to manage the NLS program, share in the design of the survey
43

Id. at 400.
Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Chi-Fang Wu, After the Revolution: Welfare Patterns since TANF
Implementation, 29 SOC. WORK RES. 199, 210 (2005).
45
CTR. FOR HUMAN RESOURCE RESEARCH, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, NLSY97 USER’S GUIDE, § 1.1
(2007), available at http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy97/docs/97HTML00/97guide/toc.htm.
46
Id.
44
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instruments, disseminate the data, and interview respondents.47 The Round 9 sample
included 7338 individuals, a retention rate of 81.7% in 2005.48 Differences between the
1997 Round 1 and 2005 Round 9 respondents were found by education and ethnicity/race
in 1997: the Round 9 sample had completed fewer years of schooling at the time of the
first interview in 1997 than had the Round 1 sample (7.65 versus 7.96, p < .001) and
white respondents had the lowest retention rate, 80.0%, compared to 84.8% for black and
82.0% for Hispanic respondents (p < .001). Though statistically significant, these
differences were deemed slight, but were nonetheless kept in mind for analysis and
discussion purposes. No difference was found on families’ 1997 income-to-poverty
ratios between Round 9 and Round 1 respondents (2.92 versus 2.81). The study sample
comprised 1098 individuals nineteen to twenty-five years of age whose self-reported
family income in survey year 2005 for calendar year 2004 was at or below twice the
federal poverty thresholds for that calendar year and for whom information on all other
study measures were available. Respondents who self-reported that they were not
eligible for the EITC were excluded from the study sample.
2. Measures
¶11

Program participation status (PPS) in 2004 was the focal variable of the study.
Respondents were classified in the following mutually exclusive categories: EITC
participants, TANF participants, EITC and TANF participants, or neither EITC nor
TANF participants. EITC participation was derived from a survey item asking
respondents whether they (or their spouses or partners) claimed or planned to claim an
Earned Income Tax Credit on their 2004 federal income tax return.49 Those who
responded that “yes,” they (or their spouses or partners) did claim or planned to claim,
were classified as EITC participants for purposes of this study. Those who responded
“no,” because they were either unaware of the EITC, or for some other reason, were
deemed not EITC participants and classified accordingly. TANF participation was
derived from a series of looped items asking respondents whether they, their spouses or
partners, or their children were receiving payments for low-income families and if so, the
month and year of payment receipt.50 Respondents who reported TANF payments for
any month in 2004 were classified as TANF recipients.51 EITC and TANF program
participation measures for 2003 were also created from similarly worded items on prior
surveys. 52 EITC participants in 2003 were coded as 1, nonparticipants as 2; TANF
recipients in 2003 were coded as 1, nonparticipants as 2.
47

Id. at § 1.2.
Id. at § 2.4.
49
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal Surveys, YINC-8000 [S65055.00],
http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 9 Questionnaire
2005” hyperlink).
50
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal Surveys, YPRG-35790 UPD,
http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 8 Questionnaire
2004” hyperlink).
51
Nearly 30% (29.8% weighted) of TANF recipients in 2004 reported receiving cash benefits in each of the
12 months, while 17.3% reported benefits in only one month.
52
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal Surveys, S48040.00,
http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 7 Questionnaire
2003” hyperlink).
48
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¶12

Staff at the Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR) at The Ohio State
University created several study measures. Socioeconomic status (SES) was obtained
from the income-to-poverty ratio (IPR), which was determined by dividing household
income by the household poverty threshold level, accounting for household size and
source of income of each respondent.53 An IPR less than or equal to one signified that
respondents lived in households whose income was at or below the poverty threshold.
These respondents were classified as poor. As previously noted, respondents reporting an
IPR more than twice the federal poverty thresholds were excluded from the study.
Hence, SES comprised two groups, the poor (IPR ≤ 1) coded as 1 and the near-poor (1 >
IPR ≤ 2) coded as 0. Hours worked was created for each calendar year. Respondents
not working in a given year were given a default value of zero (0) hours worked.54
Respondents who worked less than 1000 hours in 2004 were coded as 1, while those who
reported working more than 1000 hours were coded as 0. CHRR staff also created the
measure number of children under eighteen years of age in the household.55 Respondents
living in households with more than one child under the age of eighteen were coded as 1,
others as 0.
¶13
Sociodemographic measures included age, education, ethnicity/race, marital status,
and sex. Age was reported at the time of interview. Respondents twenty-one years of
age or younger in 2004 were coded as 1, others as 0. Education was measured as highest
grade completed in 2004: Respondents completing fewer than twelve years of education
were classified as less than high school; those completing twelve years of schooling were
classified as high school graduates; those with more than twelve years of completed
schooling were classified as beyond high school. Ethnicity/race comprised the mutually
exclusive categories of Hispanic, black (non-Hispanic), and white (non-Hispanic).
Marital status was coded such that 1 = married, 0 = unmarried. Sex was coded such that
1 = female, 0 = male.
3. Procedures
¶14

Multinomial logistic regression was used to examine the capacity of study
measures to predict PPS. The reference category was neither EITC nor TANF
participants. All analyses were done using SPSS 15.0.
53

Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal Surveys,
http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 8 Questionnaire
2004” hyperlink; then follow “Mainfile Codebook Supplement Round 8” hyperlink; then follow
“Household Income Section 2 ‘Household Poverty Status’” hyperlink). Poverty thresholds were adjusted
accordingly for Round 9 whose Mainfile Codebook Supplement was downloaded with the NLSY97 data
file. See id. (follow “NLSY97 Event History and Main File Data Rounds 1–9 Release 2007-09-30”
hyperlink).
54
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal
Surveys,http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 8
Questionnaire 2004” hyperlink; then follow “Mainfile Codebook Supplement Round 8” hyperlink; then
follow “NLSY97 Appendix 2 Employment Variable Creation” hyperlink; then follow “Main Employment
Program ‘Variables Created’” hyperlink).
55
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Longitudinal
Surveys,http://www.nlsinfo.org/ordering/display_db.php3#NLSY97 (follow “NLSY97 Round 8
Questionnaire 2004” hyperlink; then follow “Mainfile Codebook Supplement Round 8” hyperlink; then
follow “Introduction to the Created Variable Appendices ‘NLSY97 Appendix 3 Family Background and
Formation Variable Creation’” hyperlink).
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B. Results
1. Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Row percents, weighted)
Program Participation Status
Measures

EITC only
(n=538)

TANF only
(n=14)

EITC & TANF
(n=31)

Neither EITC
nor TANF
(n=515)

Less than or equal to 21

42.5

0.6

0.4

56.4

Greater than or equal to 22

50.0

1.3

3.6

45.2

Children under 18 in
Household
None or one

41.5

0.7

0.8

57.0

Two or more

63.4

2.0

6.5

28.1

Less than high school

58.0

2.9

3.3

35.8

High school graduate

50.7

0.9

3.2

45.2

Beyond high school

40.6

0.5

1.1

57.8

Hispanic

54.5

1.3

4.8

39.3

Non-Hispanic black

53.5

2.4

2.1

42.1

Non-Hispanic white

43.5

0.6

1.7

54.1

Less than or equal to 1000

42.1

1.7

2.0

54.2

Greater than 1000

49.6

0.6

2.3

47.5

Married

73.0

0.5

4.1

22.5

Not Married

41.2

1.1

1.8

55.8

No

32.9

1.1

1.6

64.4

Yes

68.9

0.9

3.2

27.0

No

47.4

0.4

0.6

51.6

Yes

30.4

16.8

43.1

9.8

Near poor

52.8

0.7

2.1

44.4

Poor

39.0

1.4

2.3

57.3

Female

49.9

1.3

2.8

46.0

Male

42.7

0.7

1.4

55.2

Age in 2004

Education

Ethnicity/race

Hours worked

Marital status in 2004

Prior program
participation
EITC in 2003

TANF in 2003

Socio-economic status

Sex
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2. Descriptive Statistics

¶15

As Table 1 shows, more than half of the sample (51.0% weighted) participated in
neither EITC nor TANF. Using 55% as the lower-limit cutoff, least likely program
participants included younger young adults (56.4%), young adults with one or no children
(57.0%), the most educated (57.8%), unmarried persons (55.8%), non-EITC participants
in 2003 (64.4%), those with family incomes below poverty (57.3%), and males (55.2%).
Using 45% as the upper-limit cutoff, most likely program participants were TANF
participants in 2003 (9.8%), married persons (22.5%), EITC participants in 2003
(27.0%), those with two or more children (28.1%), those with less than a high school
education (35.8%), and Hispanics (39.3%).
¶16
Slightly fewer than half (46.8% weighted) of the young adults participated only in
EITC, 2.2% participated in both EITC and TANF, and 1% only in TANF. Older young
adults were more likely to participate in these programs than not (54.8% versus 43.6%),
with 50% of those 22 years of age or older participating in EITC only versus 42.5% of
those 21 years of age or younger. Nearly two-thirds (63.4%) of young adults with two or
more children participated in EITC, while more than two-fifths (41.5%) of those with one
or no children participated in EITC only. The least educated young adults were more
likely than the most educated to participate in EITC only (58.0% versus 40.6%), TANF
only (2.9% versus 0.5%), and both EITC and TANF (3.3% versus 1.1%). White young
adults were the most likely to participate in neither program (51.4%) versus black
(42.1%) and Hispanic (39.3%) young adults. Black young adults were more likely to
participate in TANF only (2.4%) than were Hispanic (1.3%) or white (0.6%) young
adults; Hispanic and black young adults, however, were as likely as each other to
participate in EITC only (54.5% and 53.5%, respectively) and were more likely to do so
than white (43.5%) young adults.
¶17
As could be expected, young adults who worked more than 1000 hours in 2004
were more likely than those who worked fewer hours to participate in EITC only (49.6%
versus 42.1%) and less likely to participate in TANF only (0.6% versus 1.7%), but they
were also less likely to participate in neither program (47.5% versus 54.2%). Nearly
three-fourths (73.0%) of married young adults participated in EITC only versus only
41.2% of unmarried young adults, while unmarried young adults were twice as likely
than married young adults to participate in TANF only (1.1% versus 0.5%). Young
adults who had participated in EITC in 2003 were more likely to participate in 2004
(68.9%) than were those who had not participated in EITC in 2003 (32.9%), but they
were almost as likely to participate in TANF only (1.1% versus 0.9%). Young adults
who had participated in TANF in 2003 were more likely to participate in 2004 (16.8%)
than those who had not participated in TANF in 2003 (0.4%), and they were less likely to
participate in EITC only (30.4% versus 47.4%).
¶18
As also could be expected, near-poor young adults were more likely to participate
in EITC only than were poor young adults (52.8% versus 39.0%). More than three-fifths
(63.1% not shown in table) of near poor young adults worked more than 1000 hours per
week versus 45.0% of poor young adults. Near poor young adults were also more likely
than poor young adults to participate in TANF only (1.4% versus 0.7%) and almost as
likely to participate in both EITC and TANF (2.1% versus 2.3%). Women had slightly
greater participation percentages than men for EITC only (49.9% versus 42.7%), TANF
only (1.3% versus 0.7%), and both EITC and TANF (2.8% versus 1.4%).
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3. Table 2: Multinomial Statistic
Program Participation Status
in 2004
EITC only

TANF only

EITC & TANF

Measures
B
Age ≤ 21 in 2004
0.048
2 or more kids in Household -0.201
Education
Less than high school
0.382
High school graduate
0.016
Ethnicity/race
Hispanic
0.398
Non-Hispanic black
0.492
Hours worked > 1000
0.482
Not Married in 2004
-1.218
Prior program participation
EITC in 2003–Yes
1.359
TANF in 2003–Yes
0.984
Sex - Female
0.352
Age ≤ 21 in 2004
2 or more kids in Household
Education
Less than high school
High school graduate
Ethnicity/race
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic black
Hours worked > 1000
Not Married in 2004
Prior program participation
EITC in 2003–Yes
TANF in 2003–Yes
Sex–Female

Std Error
0.142
0.174

Wald
0.116
1.338

Sig

0.222
0.154

2.960
0.010

0.164
0.186
0.143
0.211

5.915
7.018
11.279
33.275

*
**
**
***

1.489
1.636
1.619
0.296

0.147
0.590
0.143

85.761
2.777
6.036

***

3.893
2.675
1.421

0.730
-0.314

0.744
0.695

0.964
0.204

2.075
0.730

1.349
-0.633

0.821
0.816

2.701
0.603

3.855
0.531

0.426
1.421
-0.349
-0.199

0.866
0.879
0.633
0.923

0.243
2.615
0.304
0.046

1.532
4.141
0.705
0.820

-0.237
5.303
0.961

0.694
0.862
0.743

0.117
37.872
1.670

1.465
1.016

*

***

Age ≤ 21 in 2004
2.363
0.850
7.732
**
2 or more kids in Household -1.344
0.577
5.418
*
Education
Less than high school
0.138
0.788
0.031
High school graduate
-0.164
0.604
0.073
Ethnicity/race
Hispanic
-1.430
0.760
3.540
Non-Hispanic black
0.911
0.627
2.111
Hours worked > 1000
0.719
0.539
1.780
Not Married in 2004
-0.362
0.660
0.301
Prior program participation
EITC in 2003–Yes
0.745
0.530
1.970
TANF in 2003–Yes
5.937
0.782
57.678 ***
Sex–Female
1.494
0.673
4.931
*
-2 Log Likelihood
807.79, χ2 = 419.98, df = 33, p < .001
Nagelkerke Psuedo R2
0.39
Note: The referent category for the multinomial model is “Neither EITC nor TANF”; for Education,
“Beyond High School”; for Ethnicity/race, “White.” ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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Exp (B)
1.049
0.818

0.789
201.004
2.613
10.619
0.261
1.149
0.849
0.239
2.486
2.053
0.696
2.106
378.620
4.454
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4. Multivariate Statistics

¶19

As Table 2 shows, Hispanics and blacks were 1.5 (p < .05) and 1.6 (p < .01) times
respectively more likely than whites to participate in EITC only in 2004 than in neither
EITC nor TANF. Those who worked more than 1000 hours during 2004 were also 1.6 (p
< .01) times more likely than those working less than that to participate in EITC only
than in neither EITC nor TANF. Unmarried persons were 3.4 (p < .001) times (1/.296)
less likely to participate in EITC only. Those who had participated in the EITC program
in 2003 were 3.9 (p < .001) times more likely than those who had not to participate in
EITC only in 2004. Women were 1.4 times more likely than men to participate in EITC
only in 2004 than in neither EITC nor TANF.
¶20
As Table 2 also shows, the only statistically significant predictor of TANF only
participation in 2004 was participation in TANF in 2003. Prior TANF participants were
more than 200 (p < .001) times more likely than non-participants of TANF in 2003 to
participate in TANF only in 2004 than in neither EITC nor TANF.
¶21
Finally as Table 2 reflects, those twenty-one years of age or younger were 10.6 (p <
.001) times more likely than older persons to participate in both EITC and TANF than in
neither program. Those with two or more children in the household were 3.8 (p < .05)
times less likely to participate in both EITC and TANF. Prior TANF participants were
more than 378 (p < .001) times more likely than non-participants of TANF in 2003 to
participate in both EITC and TANF than in neither program. Women were 4.5 (p < .05)
times more likely than men to participate in both EITC and TANF.
C. Discussion
¶22

Findings of the study suggest that EITC and TANF are well-targeted, but perhaps
that they are also underutilized as a whole. Program use (EITC only, TANF only, or both
EITC and TANF) varies by age, number of children in the household, ethnicity/race,
work effort, marital status, prior program participation, and sex of participants. Those
with two or more children, the least education, ethnic/racial minorities, and women are
more likely than their respective higher earning counterparts to take advantage of either
or both programs.56 It is in this sense that EITC and TANF are considered welltargeted.57 The low participation rates of TANF—less than five percent even among
those whose family income fell below official federal poverty thresholds—might be
understandable given that reduced welfare dependency was a goal of the 1996 legislation.
It would not be unreasonable to speculate that the imposed maximum five-year lifetime
limit of federal cash assistance for program participants has a discouraging effect on lowincome young adults. More research needs to be done to discern the extent to which time
limits function to discourage TANF participation. How do the take-up rates for TANF
compare to those of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program? To the
extent TANF take-up rates are found to be less than those of AFDC, what factors, other
than perhaps the effects of sample selection, as seemed to be the case in this study, might
56

It is well established that whites, highly educated persons, and men have a higher earning capacity than
their counterparts. See RICHARD K. CAPUTO, ADVANTAGE WHITE AND MALE, DISADVANTAGE BLACK AND
FEMALE: INCOME INEQUALITY, ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY AMONG FAMILIES IN A
YOUTH COHORT, 1979–1993, 39–79 (1999).
57
Other evidence for the well-targeted nature of EITC can be found in Caputo, supra note 1, at 18–22.
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account for these rates? Are low-income individuals hedging their bets by delaying use
at relatively young ages so that they remain TANF eligible should equal or more dire
need arise in the future? To what extent do state application procedures and/or
compliance strictures discourage TANF use? Given the five-year federal time limit and
even more restrictive time limits set by many states,58 perhaps the more perplexing
question is whether advocates for low-income persons and their families should seek to
increase the percentage of TANF participation among low-income young adults.
¶23
The relatively low participation rate for EITC found in this study is consistent with
previously mentioned studies showing take-up rates in the vicinity of fifty percent,59
although it is higher than the IRS estimates of twenty to twenty-five percent for 2006
reported by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson on January 31, 2008.60 The IRS seems to
be of two minds in regard to the EITC take-up rate. On the one hand, its five-point
initiative to improve the service, fairness, and compliance in the administration of the
EITC focuses more on quality control to minimize abuse, especially in regard to qualified
children residing in the household.61 On the other hand, the IRS launched campaigns to
help low-income taxpayers to take advantage of the EITC.62
¶24
Several states have their own EITC outreach initiatives and related websites, such
as Michigan,63 North Carolina,64 West Virginia,65 as well as cities such as Indianapolis,66
Nashville,67 Manchester, CT,68 and New York.69 Corporate America has also responded
with websites dedicated to promoting use of the EITC,70 as has the non-profit sector.71
58

In 2002, for example, twenty-six states had the maximum sixty month time limits, seven states adopted
shorter lifetime time limits, and only six states adopted provisions for using state funds to continue cash
assistance beyond sixty months. THE URBAN INST., STATE TIME LIMIT POLICIES (2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900769_FastFact.pdf.
59
Blumenthal, Erard & Ho, supra note 11; see also Caputo, supra note 1, at 18 (reporting that forty-nine
percent of eligible taxpayers in this study filed for the EITC).
60
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Paulson on EITC Awareness
Day (Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp791.htm
61
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC)
INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT TO CONG. (2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/irs_earned_income_tax_credit_initiative_final_report_to_congress_october_2
005.pdf.
62
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Paulson, IRS Launch Campaign to Help Low-Income
Taxpayers Take Advantage of Tax Credit, Free Tax Help (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=167470,00.html.
63
Earned Income Tax Credit Michigan Outreach Initiative, http://www.michigan.gov/eitc (last visited Feb.
23, 2009).
64
EITC Carolinas, EITC, http://www.eitc-carolinas.org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
65
Bounce Back with the Earned Income Tax Credit, http://www.wveitc.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
66
Indianapolis Asset Building Campaign, http://www.indyfamilies.org/eitc/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
67
Nashville.gov, The Mayor’s Earned Income Tax Credit Outreach Initiative,
http://www.nashville.gov/eitc/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
68
Manchester’s EITC Website, http://www.townofmanchester.org/EITC/default.cfm (last visited Feb. 23,
2009) (reporting that only twenty-two percent of Manchester residents who could have claimed the EITC in
2003 did).
69
NYC Department of Consumer Affairs, EITC: It’s Your Money Come and Get It!,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dca/html/initiatives/eitc.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
70
Corporate Voices for Working Families, EITC Toolkit,
http://www.cvworkingfamilies.org/publications/2/10/17 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
71
See National League of Cities, An EITC Toolkit for Municipal Leaders, http://www.nlc.org/IYEF/EITC/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009); United Way, United Way of America Receives $2 million Grant from Bank of
America Charitable Foundation to Promote Earned Income Tax Credit,
http://www.liveunited.org/News/upload/2008_UWA_BOA_Release.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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The IRS website proclaims that it is easier than ever to find out if one qualifies for the
EITC, and it links to related information in English and Spanish.72 There is even a
national EITC outreach initiative promoted by the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities.73 This initiative lists a number of national web-based resources,74 including
the National Tax Coalition75 and the Hatcher Group State EITC Online Resource
Center.76
¶25
Findings of this study suggest that low-income groups in general can benefit from
greater outreach. Paradoxically, given the overall well-targeted nature of the program,
findings also suggest that “less needy” groups such as those who go beyond high school,
non-Hispanic whites, and males could also benefit from greater or better targeted
outreach efforts, especially in regard to EITC. Findings also suggest, however, that the
“most needy” persons, that is those whose family incomes fall below poverty thresholds,
are the least likely to use these programs and would benefit from even greater outreach
efforts. Given that poor families are less able to afford computers in their homes and
hence have less access to the internet to take advantage of web-related EITC outreach
sites, social service agencies and legal aid offices would do well if they were to have
financial counselors on their staff who could take extra steps when necessary to ensure
that those low-income working families below the poverty thresholds avail themselves of
the EITC. They might, for example, make dedicated computer time available to such
clients between January and April for the specific purpose of assessing EITC eligibility
and assisting with tax preparation when warranted. They might also establish formal
relationships with local tax preparation agencies and refer potentially EITC eligible
clients accordingly or with local libraries that provide technology access for individuals
in poverty.77

72

Internal Revenue Service, Individuals and EITC,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
73
National EITC Outreach Partnership, http://www.cbpp.org/eitc-partnership (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
74
National EITC Outreach Partnership, National EITC Web Resources, http://www.cbpp.org/eitcpartnership/resources.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
75
National Community Tax Coalition, Building Support for the EITC, http://www.taxcoalition.org/taxEitc.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
76
State EITC, State EITC Online Resource Center, http://www.stateeitc.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
77
Dean J. Kue, Christie M. Koontz, J. Andrew Magpantay, Keith Curry Lance & Ann M. Seidl, Using
Public Libraries to Provide Technology Access for Individuals in Poverty: A Nationwide Analysis of
Library Market Areas Using a Geographic Information System, 21 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES. 299, 300–01
(1999).
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